Authors
Casey Deccio, Alden Hilton, Michael Briggs, Trevin Avery, Robert Richardson
Publication date
2020/10/27
Book
Proceedings of the ACM Internet Measurement Conference
Pages
65-77
Description
Networks not employing destination-side source address validation (DSAV) expose themselves to a class of pernicious attacks which could be easily prevented by filtering inbound traffic purporting to originate from within the network. In this work, we survey the pervasiveness of networks vulnerable to infiltration using spoofed addresses internal to the network. We issue recursive Domain Name System (DNS) queries to a large set of known DNS servers worldwide, using various spoofed-source addresses. We classify roughly half of the 62,000 networks (autonomous systems) we tested as vulnerable to infiltration due to lack of DSAV. As an illustration of the dangers these networks expose themselves to, we demonstrate the ability to fingerprint the operating systems of internal DNS servers. Additionally, we identify nearly 4,000 DNS server instances vulnerable to cache poisoning attacks due to insufficient---and often …
Total citations
20212022202320242831
Scholar articles
C Deccio, A Hilton, M Briggs, T Avery, R Richardson - Proceedings of the ACM Internet Measurement …, 2020