Authors
Venkatanathan Varadarajan, Yinqian Zhang, Thomas Ristenpart, Michael Swift
Publication date
2015
Conference
24th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 15)
Pages
913-928
Description
Public infrastructure-as-a-service clouds, such as Amazon EC2, Google Compute Engine (GCE) and Microsoft Azure allow clients to run virtual machines (VMs) on shared physical infrastructure. This practice of multi-tenancy brings economies of scale, but also introduces the risk of sharing a physical server with an arbitrary and potentially malicious VM. Past works have demonstrated how to place a VM alongside a target victim (co-location) in early-generation clouds and how to extract secret information via side-channels. Although there have been numerous works on side-channel attacks, there have been no studies on placement vulnerabilities in public clouds since the adoption of stronger isolation technologies such as Virtual Private Clouds (VPCs).
Total citations
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Scholar articles
V Varadarajan, Y Zhang, T Ristenpart, M Swift - 24th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security …, 2015